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839 
RAPE SHIELD LAWS AND THE SOCIAL MEDIA 
REVOLUTION: DISCOVERABILITY OF SOCIAL MEDIA—





Rape Shield laws serve a valuable purpose in our society.2  
Before Rape Shield laws, rape victims were forced to prove that they 
were in fact victims, as opposed to willing participants.3  To demon-
strate that the victim was a willing participant, a defendant was al-
lowed to introduce evidence regarding the victim’s sexual predisposi-
tion or prior sexual behavior.4  Thus, the defendant’s strategy was to 
show that the victim had either consented or “must have asked for 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. 2004 in Busi-
ness Administration, American University.  I would like to thank Associate Dean Myra 
Berman and Professor Dan Subotnik for inspiring and motivating me to write on this subject. 
To Brittany Fiorenza and Avi “Sarge” Goldstein, I cannot thank you enough for your assis-
tance.   I would also like to thank my loving wife, Jill, whose unconditional love and encour-
agement were invaluable to me throughout the research, writing, and editing of this Com-
ment, not to mention law school in general.  Also, a very special thank you to Grandma Dear 
because, without you, I might not have been a member of the Law Review.  Finally, thank 
you to my family for their love and support. 
1 For the purposes of this Comment and continuity, the “victims” discussed herein will all 
be referred to in the female gender and men will commit all of the “attacks.”  All sentiments 
and thoughts expressed herein, however, apply with equal strength and weight to either sex 
in similar situations. 
2 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (“The rule aims to safeguard the alleged 
victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that 
is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual in-
nuendo into the fact-finding process.”). 
3 Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal 
for the Second Decade, 80 MINN. L. REV. 763, 825 (1986) (discussing a defendant who in-
tended to show that the victim fabricated her story so that her parents would not punish her 
for being a willing participant). 
4 Id. 
1
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it.”5  As a result of these tactics, and in a very real sense, victims 
were being “victimized” for a second time.6  Instead of being a victim 
of an insulated crime like rape, where only the attacker and victim are 
present, rape victims were being victimized in a courtroom, in public, 
for everyone to see.  For obvious reasons, victims felt it best to re-
main anonymous.7  Instead of coming forward in the hope of bringing 
their assailants to justice, victims felt it was safer to stay out of the 
public eye.8  It was bad enough being a victim of rape; the whole 
world certainly did not need to know about the victim’s reputation for 
being promiscuous or prude.  
In response to this problem, and in the interest of prosecuting 
more sexual offenders, Congress and the states began introducing 
Rape Shield laws9 that were designed to protect rape victims and en-
courage them to come forward against their attackers.10  These laws 
are intended to prevent defendants from exposing a victim’s prior 
sexual activities at trial as a means of defending his own actions.11  
Federally, the law limits the availability of information a defendant 
may present regarding a victim during a trial.12  While the wording 
may differ between the federal rules and each state, the statutes are 
universally intended to “end the ‘degrading and embarrassing disclo-
sure of intimate details about the victims’ private lives.”13 
While Rape Shield laws serve a vital purpose in our society, 
this Comment argues that, with the proliferation of Social Media 
 
5 Elizabeth J. Kramer, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-
Sex Rape, 73. N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 318 (1998). 
6 Tracey A. Berry, Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin’s Rape Shield Law: Will 
Those Words Come Back to Haunt You?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2002). 
7 Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1594 
(2007) (“Because of the personal, sexual nature of the crime, and of the many ways in which 
rape victims are maligned in the media and the courtroom, it is understandable that victims 
wish to remain anonymous.”). 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (Federal “Rape Shield”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1421 
(2012) (Arizona’s “Rape Shield”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 2012) (Mich-
igan’s “Rape Shield”). 
10 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (“By affording victims protection in most 
instances, the rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to partici-
pate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”). 
11 FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1). 
12 Id. 
13 Jason M. Price, Constitutional Law–Sex, Lies and Rape Shield Statutes: The Constitu-
tionality of Interpreting Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Victim’s 
Motive to Fabricate, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 551 (1996) (citing 124 CONG. REC. 34, 
913) (1978)) (statement by Rep. Mann). 
2
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websites, certain evidence of a victim’s prior sexual activities should 
be discoverable and admissible in court on the ground that they are 
not private.  Section II provides the history and rationale behind Rape 
Shield laws; section III discusses the impact of Rape Shield on the 
accused; section IV provides a general explanation of how prolific 
Social Media websites have become; section V discusses the effect of 
the proliferation of Social Media websites on the evidentiary rules of 
discoverability and admissibility; section VI provides a workable hy-
pothetical, which establishes the baseline for the rationale behind this 
Comment, and section VII concludes with a recommendation for a 
modification to existing Rape Shield laws. 
II. HISTORY OF RAPE SHIELD 
Rape has been a crime on the books for nearly two centu-
ries,14 but the extensive level of protection afforded to victims 
through Rape Shield laws is a relatively modern phenomenon.15  
Rape laws have required varying levels of action from victims, in or-
der to prove they were, in fact, raped.16  Depending on the era, a vic-
tim would have had to prove she was raped through corroboration or 
by showing that she displayed “utmost” or “reasonable” resistance to 
the attacker’s attempt.17 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned requirements of proof, a 
victim of an alleged rape was traditionally forced to establish that she 
was not unchaste, as a practical matter.18  Before Rape Shield, de-
fense teams tried to show that the victim had “ask[ed] for it” by being 
too promiscuous,19 as opposed to having been a victim of a crime.  It 
was believed that if a woman was unchaste, she had somehow placed 
herself in a situation that would warrant, or even justify, the resulting 
 
14 People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192 (1838) (accusation of rape). 
15 Winfield v. Virginia, 225 Va. 211, 213 (Va. 1983) (a case of first impression involving 
a sexual assault prosecution and the admissibility of evidence in light of the “rape shield” 
provision of Code §18.2-67.7). 
16 Richard A. Wayman, Note, Lucas Comes to Visit Iowa: Balancing Interests Under Io-
wa’s Rape-Shield Evidentiary Rule, 77 IOWA L. REV. 865, 868-71 (1992) (discussing the his-
tory of rape shield statutes). 
17 Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search 
for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 985 (2008) (discussing the impact of 
Rape Shield Laws on the accused and their constitutional rights). 
18 Wayman, supra note 16, at 869. 
19 Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1588. 
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actions of her attacker.20  Supporters of the common law evidentiary 
rules, which allowed evidence of a victim’s extra-marital or pre-
marital sexual activities, believed that a woman’s unchaste ways were 
relevant to whether a woman consented to the alleged attack.21  De-
fense teams questioned victims regarding their prior sexual behavior 
in an effort to show that the victim “failed to personify a model of 
sexual modesty.”22  Therefore, under common law, unless she could 
prove that she was a virgin before the alleged attack, the general pub-
lic rarely believed a victim had been actually raped.23 
In order to determine if the alleged rape was a crime, or simp-
ly a situation that the victim invited upon herself, courts repeatedly 
permitted inquires into the personal and sexual history of the victim.24  
In 1838, a New York court allowed “[t]he prosecutrix [to] be shown 
to be in fact a common prostitute; so also a previous voluntary con-
nection between her and the prisoner may be proved; and evidence 
may be given of particular acts and associations, indicating on her 
part a want of chastity.”25 
In an effort to protect rape victims, feminist organizations, as 
well as law enforcement, argued that allowing defendants to discuss a 
woman’s sexual history was unfair and unjustifiable.26  As a result, 
the first Rape Shield law was enacted in Michigan in 1974.27  Over 
the course of twenty-four years, Congress and all fifty states enacted 
Rape Shield laws with the overarching goal of protecting a victim’s 
privacy.28  The last state to enact a Rape Shield law was Arizona in 
 
20 Abbot, 19 Wend. at 192. 
21 Price, supra note 13, at 550. 
22 Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent 
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 54 (2002). 
23 Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1587 (“Any prior sexual activity on her part . . . was deemed 
to undermine the veracity of her claim . . . .”). 
24 Abbot, 19 Wend. at 192. 
25 Id. 
26 Price, supra note 13, at 550 (citing Wayman, supra note 16, at 869-71): 
They argued that: (1) sexual morality had changed since the adoption of 
the common-law doctrine which allowed evidence about the victim’s 
unchaste character; (2) exclusionary laws are needed to protect “com-
plainants from a ‘second rape’ in the courtroom;” and (3) rape shield 
laws would attempt to balance “gender-bias in the determination of con-
sent.” 
Id. 
27 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 2013). 
28 Anderson, supra note 22, at 88. 
4
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1998.29 
The rationale behind Rape Shield laws was based on a con-
cern that victims feared coming forward.30  The belief was that “by 
protecting the victim’s sexual privacy, the whole [rape trial] process 
may be less traumatic for her.”31  Victims feared that their prior sexu-
al conduct would be displayed for all to see in the public forum of a 
courtroom.32  There was also concern that, after having her sexual 
history examined in the court, a woman may feel as though “she 
ha[d] done something wrong by having sex.”33  Rape Shield laws al-
lowed victims to seek justice, without being victimized by the court 
of public opinion.34 
These statutes are designed to place restrictions on the types 
of evidence that may be discoverable and admissible with regard to 
the sexual conduct of rape victims.35  As a result of these rules, de-
fense teams are no longer allowed to present evidence in order “to 
prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior” or “to prove a 
victim’s sexual predisposition.”36  In effect, these rules have served to 
change a defendant’s strategy from attempting to show the victim’s 
sexual tendencies, to showing the victim’s mendacity.37  These rules 
have proven to be beneficial by reducing the number of blatant at-
tempts to embarrass, shame or discourage a victim from testifying 
against her attacker.38 
Without a doubt, the common law doctrine that a female vic-
tim somehow invited the crime of rape, simply because of her prior 
sexual escapades or employment,39 offers no protection to actual rape 
victims.  However, as a result of current rape shield rules, the pendu-
 
29 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1421 (2012).  See also 1998 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. 281 
(West). 
30 Anderson, supra note 22, at 88. 
31 Price, supra note 13, at 564 (citing Lisa M. Dillman, Note, Stephens v. Miller: Restora-
tion of the Rape Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights, 28 IND. L. REV. 97, 113 (1994)). 
32 Id. at 563. 
33 Id. at 564. 
34 Id. 
35 See generally FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1)(2). 
36 Id. 
37 Christopher Bopst, Rape Shield Laws and Prior False Accusations of Rape: The Need 
for Meaningful Legislative Reform, 24 J. LEGIS. 125, 132 (1998). 
38 Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1599 (“[B]latant attempts to invade the privacy of the vic-
tim, shame her or otherwise discourage her from testifying have been limited by rape 
shield.”). 
39 Abbot, 19 Wend. at 192.  Prostitutes were long considered to lack “general moral char-
acter,” thus rendering their claims of rape unsubstantiated.  Id. 
5
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lum of proof required in rape cases has swung in disfavor of the de-
fendant, to the extreme.  As Professor Richard Klein puts it, “in the 
last thirty-five years, there has been a steady erosion of the due pro-
cess rights of those accused of rape.”40  In effect, Rape Shield rules 
have given alleged victims carte blanche to accuse a person of rape, 
absent any proof, without fear of any repercussions. 
III. IMPACT OF RAPE SHIELD LAWS ON THE ACCUSED 
Men have faced the threat of false rape accusations since bib-
lical times.41  There are a myriad of reasons why a woman would fab-
ricate a rape; some of those reasons include a desire to hide her own 
promiscuity, a desire/fantasy to be raped, or a desire for vengeance.42  
“One also wonders whether the emotional nature of rape, the public 
pressure to catch strangers who rape, and racist stereotyping of rap-
ists influence police to use different tactics in rape cases, resulting in 
more false confessions and testimony.”43  For whatever reason, inno-
cent men run the risk of being accused of a rape they did not com-
mit.44  The impact of these false accusations is very real.45  It occurs 
frequently enough to warrant the creation of a website called the 
“Community for the Wrongly Accused,” a successor to the False 
Rape Society, which regularly tracks false rape accusations through 
its website blog.46 
One of the most recent infamous cases involved rape charges 
against the Duke University lacrosse team in 2006.47  Duke Universi-
ty is a school with students of diverse backgrounds;48 many of the 
students are wealthy.49  In March 2006, the Duke lacrosse team held a 
 
40 Klein, supra note 17, at 982. 
41 Bopst, supra note 37, at 125.  See Denise R. Johnson, Prior False Allegations of Rape: 
Falsus In Uno, Falsus in Omnibus, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 243 (1995). 
42 Johnson, supra note 41, at 243. 
43 Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1591. 
44 Id. 
45 COMMUNITY OF THE WRONGLY ACCUSED, http://www.cotwa.info/ (last visited Apr. 18, 
2013) (a regularly updated website containing blog postings about false rape accusations 
across the country). 
46 Id. 
47 Looking Back at the Duke Lacrosse Case, DUKE U., http://today.duke.edu/showcase/ 
lacrosseincident/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
48 Profile of the Class of 2015, DUKE U., http://admissions.duke.edu/images/uploads/ 
Class2015Profile.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
49 Cost & Financial Aid, DUKE UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS, http://admissions.duke.edu/ 
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party where two African American exotic dancers were invited to 
provide entertainment.50  At one point during the party, the two danc-
ers were separated and one of the dancers was dragged into a bath-
room where she claimed she was “hit, kicked and strangled” by one 
of the players.51  The accuser further indicated that she was told by 
one of the players, “Sweetheart, you can’t leave.”52  Almost immedi-
ately, the lacrosse rape story made headlines across the country.53 
Two players were indicted by May of 2006.54  The District 
Attorney handling the case, Mike Nifong, took it upon himself to 
wage a very public war against the defendants.55  He thought it was 
his duty to convict the defendants as a result of “the circumstances of 
rape,” which showed “a deep racial motivation” for the events that 
took place at the party.56  However, after continued investigation, the 
prosecution determined that there were too many flaws in the case 
and too many inconsistencies in the victim’s stories.57  Eventually, 
the rape charges were dropped,58 but the damage to the Duke players’ 
reputations was done. 
The impact of the false accusations by the exotic dancer was 
swift and overwhelming.59  The players did not have the opportunity 
to even attempt to rebut the claims of both the accuser and the Dis-
trict Attorney before they were indicted.60  Much of what was said 
 
application/aid (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
50 Karla Shuster, Tom Rock, Steven Marcus & Tom Allegra, Details in Duke Rape Inves-




53 Duke Rape 2006, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (indicating that over 5,000,000 re-
sults were associated with the term “Duke Rape 2006”). 
54 State of North Carolina, Indictment of Collin Finnerty: First Degree Forcible Rape 
(2006), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/duke/fnnrty41706ind1.gif; 
State of North Carolina, Indictment of Reade William Seligman: First Degree Forcible Rape 
(2006), available at http://files.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/duke/slg41706ind1.gif. 
55 R. Taylor Matthews, The Duke Lacrosse Rape Case – A Public Branding, Is There a 
Remedy? 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 669, 670 (2011) (Mr. Nifong granted more than fifty inter-
views to national news media outlets). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 671 (“[T]he accuser’s ever-evolving tale made the claim that she was raped at the 
Duke lacrosse party even more doubtful.  The accuser gave varying accounts of the rape, 
claiming she was raped by ‘five guys,’ then claiming she was raped by ‘three men,’ while 
also stating that ‘no one forced her to have sex.’ ”). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Matthews, supra note 55, at 678. 
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was received as fact, until the investigation concluded.61  The play-
ers’ names became well-known nationwide and, unfortunately, syn-
onymous with the term “Duke Rape Case.”62 
While it is true that the exonerated players have some reme-
dies available to them,63 as the saying goes, you can’t “unhear” what 
you’ve already heard.  These innocent young men will be forever tied 
to the “Duke Rape Case.”  Furthermore, it is likely that a defamation 
lawsuit against the District Attorney or the State of North Carolina 
would not be successful.64 
IV. PROLIFERATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
As of the publication of this Comment, Facebook, Twitter and 
LinkedIn are the major players in the Social Media world.65  Since 
2003, these three sites have recruited members at a record setting 
pace.66  A person would be hard-pressed to find a member of Genera-
tion-Y (or the next generation) who does not have an active account 
with at least one of these networks.67  The proliferation of social net-
working, in less than a decade, has created a public forum through 
which children and adults can exchange communications and digital 
media, stay updated with current events, or even make plans for a 
given evening.68  Often this information is “posted” on someone’s 
“wall,” which is available to the general public, or at a minimum, the 
wall owner’s “friends.”69 
As expected, Social Media sites are exactly that, social, not 
private.  It is readily apparent that Social Media has changed the way 
 
61 See id. at 676 (noting that “the media disseminated the statements [made by the District 
Attorney] worldwide on television, in the newspaper and on the Internet”). 
62 See generally id. at 676-77. 
63 Id. at 697.  The players could have potentially brought a defamation suit for money 
damages.  Id. at 697. 
64 Matthews, supra note 55, at 697 (since the County Prosecutor position was created by 
the North Carolina Constitution, “the chances of a successful defamation action against the 
county, the state or the prosecutor in his official capacity are remote”). 
65 Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites: November 2012, EBIZMBA, 
http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
66 Joanna Brenner, Pew Internet: Social Networking, PEW INTERNET (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://pewinternet.org/Commentary/2012/March/Pew-Internet-Social-Networking-full-
detail.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
67 Id. 
68 See generally FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
69 Id. 
8
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people live their lives.70  Many people use these sites for “network-
ing” but there are studies suggesting, in fact, that people are not really 
networking as much as they are “broadcasting their lives to an outer 
tier of acquaintances . . . .”71 
V. IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS 
EVIDENCE 
Social Media has greatly impacted the judicial process.  “Less 
than 10 years ago, there was no cause of action for defamation by 
Twitter, no crime of creating a false online persona, and it would not 
have been possible to serve a defendant with process via a social 
networking site—yet all three exist today.”72  The age of Social Me-
dia can be defined in one word: More.73  With the proliferation of So-
cial Media websites, more people have more access, to more infor-
mation, more readily than ever before.74  In fact, even if an individual 
is not a member of a social networking site, “there is no denying the 
fact that Social Media content can serve as an excellent and unparal-
leled source of information.”75  The availability of this information 
has a distinct impact on discovery and the courts.76  Attorneys are us-
ing these websites, more often than ever before, to find information 
about their clients, opposing parties, judges, and jurors alike.77 
Traditionally, courts frowned upon information that originat-
 
70 Jonathan E. DeMay, The Implications of the Social Media Revolution on Discovery in 
U.S. Litigation, A.B.A. (Summer 2011), available at www.condonlaw.com/attachments/brief 
_sum11_demay.pdf (“The explosive growth of Social Media, coupled with the continuing 
transition from the use of desktop and laptop computers to increasingly powerful mobile de-
vices, has provided virtually instantaneous and constant access to an increasingly intercon-
nected digital world . . . .”). 
71 Primates on Facebook, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13176775. 
72 John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from 
Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 469 (2011). 
73 DeMay, supra note 70, at 55 (discussing the explosive growth of Social Media and the 
availability of access to the digital world). 
74 Id. 
75 John M. Miller, Is MySpace Really My Space? Examining the Discoverability of the 
Contents of Social Media Accounts, 30 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 28, 28 (2011). 
76 Christopher Hopkins, Using Iphone Location in Data Discovery, 30 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 
4, 6 (2011) (“E-discovery has been a hot, if not over-emphasized, issue, and broad discovery 
orders have been the subject of several appeals.”). 
77 Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on Face-
book? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics and Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366 (2010).  Attorneys 
also use this information to confirm or undermine their clients’ cases.  Id. 
9
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ed on the Internet.78  Courts viewed this information as unreliable, 
useless, and merely gossip.79  However, more recently, courts have 
begun to embrace the Internet as not only a legitimate source of in-
formation, but also a valuable tool for attorneys.80  Moreover, some 
federal judges have gone so far as to confirm their judicial intuition 
through Internet research.81  Courts have begun to embrace media 
content as discoverable, but only after balancing a number of fac-
tors.82 
There is a growing trend today to allow evidence from Social 
Media websites.83  Most courts now allow discovery of relevant in-
formation that a user posts on Facebook, LinkedIn, or Twitter ac-
counts.84  In fact, courts have allowed discovery of information from 
Social Media in cases ranging from personal injury to sexual harass-
ment.85  As one might expect, attorneys must adhere to rules and reg-
ulations regarding discovery and ethics.86  Generally speaking, courts 
tend to apply traditional rules to ethical matters when it comes to the 
use of social media.87  Before a court decides if it will allow discov-
ery of the information, courts balance several factors including rele-
vancy, need for the information, alternative availability of the infor-
mation, and “the privacy interests of the party from whom the 
information is sought.”88 
 
78 See Browning, supra note 72, at 470 (discussing the “sea of change” in attitudes of the 
courts regarding evidence which comes from the Internet). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 470. 
81 Id. (citing United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). 
82 Miller, supra note 75, at 28. (Those factors include: “[T]he relevancy of the information 
sought, the need for information in the subject litigation, the availability of the information 
from other sources, and the privacy interests of the party from whom the information is 
sought.”). 
83 See generally Browning, supra note 72 (discussing how trial and appellate courts in 
various jurisdictions have begun to allow discoverability of Social Media content). 
84 Boggs, supra note 77, at 367. 
85 Miller, supra note 75, at 29 (Social Media discovery has been used as a means to “re-
view[] personal messages sent by an employee in a sexual harassment case to assessing a 
plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment damages in a personal injury defense case by reviewing his or 
her photographs posted online after an accident”). 
86 Sandra Hornberger, Social Networking Websites: Impact on Litigation and the Legal 
Profession in Ethics, Discovery, and Evidence, 27 TOURO L. REV. 279, 285 (2011). 
87 Id. at 290. 
88 Miller, supra note 75, at 28. 
10
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A. Privacy Settings on Social Media Websites 
Social Media websites generally have usage restrictions and 
privacy settings.89  However, it is usually up to the individual to de-
termine what information is available and who has access to that in-
formation.90  In general, if the settings are not adjusted, these web-
sites allow everyone on the network to see the information that a 
person has posted.91 
Social Media sites, like Facebook, allow a user to provide 
“status updates” which can contain anything from a random thought, 
to details about the user’s weekend.92  Furthermore, users who have 
access to a person’s “wall” (depending on the privacy settings) can 
not only see what the person has written, but also comment if they so 
desire.93  Twitter functions slightly differently.  A user on Twitter can 
post up to 140 characters in what is called a “tweet.”94  These 
“tweets,” similar to status updates, can range from internal thoughts 
to details of the past weekend’s events.95  Depending on privacy set-
tings, this information is made available to other users (“followers”) 
only, or anyone who has access to a computer and the Internet.96  Fa-
cebook, for example, allows users to disseminate photos and videos, 
so long as the content does not violate usage policies of the site.97 
These sites also allow, and in fact urge, users to create a 
 
89 Facebook Legal Terms, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2013); The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-
twitter-rules (last visited Apr. 18, 2013) (users can adjust their settings to control how many 
people have access to the information contained on the user’s page). 
90 Facebook Privacy Settings and Tools, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab 
=privacy&ref=mb (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
91 Id. 
92 Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking 
Privacy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 293 
(2011) (“[Facebook] is a controlled ecosystem that inspires its inhabitants to share personal 
information and reveal intimate thoughts.”). 
93 David Narkiewicz, The Dangers of MySpace, Facebook and YouTube, 30 PA. LAW. 56, 
57 (2008) (discussing how his teenage son and friends have the ability to post what they 
want on each other’s Social Media pages, which are freely viewable to the public at large). 
94 About Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
95 Id. 
96 Semitsu, supra note 92, at 316 (indicating that while Twitter users may require that only 
pre-approved users be allowed to “follow” their “tweets,” Twitter’s privacy policy indicates 
that users should not assume that the information they are posting is private). 
97 Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK,  https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
11
Koslow: Rape Shield Laws
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
850 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
unique profile with specific details about themselves.98  Information 
such as location, birthday, sex, relationship status, interests, and lan-
guages the user speaks are suggested topics for a user to share with 
the Social Network.99  Many users find theses sites to be useful ways 
to express themselves and to meet other people with whom they can 
associate and relate.100 
Finally, these sites generally provide a listing of “friends” or 
“followers” which generally represent who the user is associated 
with.101  Most often, these sites require that the user accept a person 
as a “friend” or “follower.”102  Information exchanged among 
“friends” on these sites can be divided into three categories, generally 
based on how accessible the information is to the public.103  At its 
core, Social Media information is available to the public on the 
whole.104  “[S]emi-private information includes content that is re-
stricted to either a self-selected group of ‘friends’ or a wider, unman-
ageable group . . . .”105  Lastly, most Social Media sites allow for 
“private messages,” akin to emails, which users can send to each oth-
er on an individual basis.106  The individual user generally has the 
ability to define what information is available to each group.107  De-
pending on the user’s privacy settings, the information he or she 
posts, as well as the friends/followers the user has, can be available to 
anyone with a computer and Internet connection. 
The question then becomes, what information, if any, should 
courts recognize as viable evidence?  Depending on the jurisdiction, 
some attorneys have been more successful than others in persuading 
 
98 Semitsu, supra note 92, at 293. 
99 Facebook User Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/seth.koslow/info (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2013). 
100 Semitsu, supra note 92, at 293. 
101 Facebook User Friend Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/seth.koslow/ 
friends?ft_ref=mni (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
102 Facebook Friend Request Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/?sk=ff (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
103 Evan E. North, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Networking 
Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1288 (2010). 
104 Id. (this level of public disclosure is very general; it “may include any text or media 
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courts to allow status updates as evidence.108  In New York, one court 
found that a Facebook status update, along with other corroborating 
evidence, was sufficient to establish an alibi.109  However, a Missouri 
court held that status updates that were not “even tangentially related 
to the events of the night in question” were inadmissible on relevance 
grounds.110  Some attorneys find that basic profile information can be 
useful evidence,111 and some attorneys find a user’s friend/follower 
list can be an excellent starting point for potential witnesses.112 
B. Is What a Person Posts on the Internet “Private”? 
Some believe that information which is available online 
“should not enjoy the same privacy protection as information main-
tained in someone’s private home.”113  While the Internet may foster 
the idea that a person can remain anonymous, the fact that people are 
more willing to share information online results in private infor-
mation becoming public.114  A computer savvy person can gain ac-
cess to virtually any information that is placed on the Internet.  How-
ever, at what point does a person’s conduct on the Internet turn from 
private to public activity?  Depending on the individual user’s priva-
cy settings, anything and everything a user posts on his or her profile 
is ostensibly accessible to the rest of the Facebook, LinkedIn, or 
Twitter community. 
While it is common knowledge that the Internet is not “pri-
 
108 Peter S. Kozinetis & Aaron J. Lockwood, Discovery in the Age of Facebook, 47 ARIZ. 
ATTY. 42, 44 (2011) (“In many cases, particularly where a party’s physical condition, mental 
state or lifestyle is at issue, the relevance of [S]ocial [M]edia is clear, and courts have not 
hesitated to permit broad discovery of such information.”). 
109 Browning, supra note 72, at 472.  See Damiano Beltrami, I’m Innocent. Just Check My 
Status on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/ 
nyregion/12facebook.html?_r=0 (discussing how defendant Rodney Bradford, suspected of 
robbery, provided an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the crime through the use of his 
Facebook status updates). 
110 Browning, supra note 72, at 472; see also State v. Corwin, 295 S.W.3d 572, 579 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
111 Browning, supra note 72, at 472 (some attorneys have found information regarding an 
individual’s contacts or employer, found on LinkedIn, to be useful). 
112 Id. at 471. 
113 Hornberger, supra note 86, at 281 (quoting Tiffany M. Williams, Social Networking 
Sites Carry Ethics Traps and Reminders, A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/social-networking-
ethics.html). 
114 Browning, supra note 72, at 485. 
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vate,” something not as well established, but that must be considered, 
is the point when something available on the Internet becomes “pub-
lic.”  Currently, the average user on Facebook has 120 “friends,” 
which means that, at a minimum, the information the user posts is 
disseminated to 120 people the moment it is posted.115  Furthermore, 
it is not uncommon for users to have more than 500 “friends,” which 
means the information they post is shared with at least that many 
people.116  The actual number of people who see the information 
could be significantly higher, depending on the user’s privacy set-
tings.117 
C. Social Media Evidence in Other Areas of the Law 
“Given [the] abundance of photos, video, statements and other 
content flooding social networking sites, it is hardly surprising to find 
lawyers from virtually all areas of practice digging for such digital 
dirt.”118  According to a survey from the American Academy of Mat-
rimonial Lawyers (“AAML”), over 81% of AAML members indicat-
ed that they had used social networking sites as a source for evidence 
in 2010, more so than they had five years earlier.119  Matrimonial at-
torneys are not alone when it comes to mining Social Media sites for 
valuable information.120  The practice areas that have reaped the ben-
efits of Social Media discovery range from prosecutors and criminal 
defense attorneys to defamation attorneys and securities litigators.121 
In 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with 
electronic discovery were amended.122  The Rules now include 
 
115 Cameron Marlow, Maintained Relationships on Facebook, FACEBOOK (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=55257228858. 
116 Id. (discussing that average users have 120 friends, which means some users have sig-
nificantly more and others significantly fewer friends). 
117 Facebook Privacy Settings and Tools, supra note 90 (users can control who sees their 
updates, pictures, and postings via this “privacy settings” page). 
118 Browning, supra note 72, at 467. 
119 Big Surge in Social Networking Evidence Says Survey of Nation’s Top Divorce Law-
yers, AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWS. (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.aaml.org/about-the-
academy/press/press-releases/e-discovery/big-surge-social-networking-evidence-says-
survey-. 
120 Browning, supra note 72, at 467. 
121 Id. 
122 Hornberger, supra note 86, at 293 (citing Therese Craparo & Anthony J. Diana, The 
Next Generation of E-Discovery: Social Networking and Other Emerging Web 2.0 Technol-
ogies (Tip of the Month), MONDAQ (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/84000/ 
IT+internet/The+Next+Generation+of+EDiscovery+Social+Networking+and+Other+Emerg
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“broad language permitting discovery ‘stored in any medium’ ” in 
order to adapt to rapid and constant changes in technology and com-
munication.123  While the proliferation of Social Media sites is a 
somewhat new phenomenon, some courts are allowing information 
from these websites to be discovered, as long as the subject matter is 
related to an issue being litigated.124 
D. Case Law on the Discoverability of Social Media 
Evidence 
In EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC,125 the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed a complaint, on 
behalf of two claimants, on the ground of sexual harassment against 
their employer, “Simply Storage.”126  During the discovery phase, 
four requests were made for various copies of digital information 
from the claimants’ Social Media pages.127  The EEOC argued, in 
relevant part, that the requests should be denied because “they im-
properly infringe on the claimants’ privacy, and will harass and em-
barrass the claimants.”128 
In response to the requests, the court discussed the possibility 
that discovery of the claimants’ social networking sites could reveal 
private information that might be embarrassing, but the court deter-
 
ing+Web+20+Technologies+Tip+of+the+Month. 
123 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1): 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as fol-
lows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or 
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know 
of any discoverable matter.  For good cause, the court may order discov-
ery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.  
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence.  All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C). 
Id. 
124 Hornberger, supra note 86, at 293. 
125 270 F.R.D. 430 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
126 Id. at 432. 
127 Id.  Defendant SNS sought, through four requests, photographs or videos posted by the 
complainants as well as electronic copies of the complainants’ Facebook and MySpace pro-
files, including comments, messages and pictures.  Id. 
128 Id. 
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mined that this possibility was not overly significant.129  The court 
reasoned that simply because a person expects his or her communica-
tions to remain private, it does not follow that the person’s communi-
cations should be protected from discovery.130  The court ruled that 
“the mere fact that the claimants’ profiles had been set on private did 
not preclude the requested discovery.”131  Furthermore, the court not-
ed that Social Media sites, like Facebook, are designed for people to 
communicate with other people, not just to talk to themselves.132  
Significantly, the court allowed the discoverability of information 
that was being sought because it “revealed, referred or related . . . to 
events that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant 
emotion, feeling or mental state.”133 
In Romano v. Steelcase, Inc.,134 the defendant, Steelcase, 
moved the court for an order granting access to “current and histori-
cal Facebook and MySpace pages and accounts . . . .”135  The defend-
ant sought this information to counter the plaintiff’s claims of injuries 
and loss of enjoyment of life.136  The plaintiff opposed the order cit-
ing a violation of her Fourth Amendment right to privacy.137 
In response to the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment assertion, the 
court noted that requiring a plaintiff to disclose information from his 
or her Facebook page was not a violation of privacy because a user of 
Social Media does not have a “legitimate reasonable expectation of 
privacy” about the information the user posts or shares.138  Further-
more, an individual’s privacy concerns, by definition, are lessened 
when that person chooses to disclose information to others, and there-
fore, since Facebook (and other Social Media sites) cannot guarantee 
complete privacy, an individual has no expectation of privacy when 
posting on a Social Media site.139 
In Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Agency of Nevada, 
 
129 EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 437. 
130 Id. 
131 Miller, supra note 75, at 32 (citing EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 434). 
132 EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 437 (“Facebook is not used as means by which account holders 
carry on monologues with themselves.” (citing Leduc v. Roman, available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2009/2009canlii6838/2009canlii6838.html)). 
133 Miller, supra note 75, at 32l (citing EEOC, 270 F.R.D at 436). 
134 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
135 Id. at 651. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 655. 
138 Id. at 656. 
139 Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
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Inc.140 the plaintiff brought suit for gender-based sexual harass-
ment.141  The plaintiff alleged that one of defendant’s vice-presidents 
“began sending her inappropriate and sexually explicit emails on her 
office computer on at least a weekly basis.”142  The plaintiff further 
alleged that another vice-president coerced her to have sexual rela-
tions by threatening to fire her husband if she refused.143  As time 
progressed, the sexually explicit emails and coerced sexual encoun-
ters occurred more frequently.144 
In response to the suit, Fidelity Title brought a motion to 
compel before the court seeking email communications allegedly sent 
through Plaintiff’s MySpace profile.145  MySpace refused to provide 
the content of the private messages absent a signed release from the 
plaintiff.146  The plaintiff argued that the information requested was 
“irrelevant and improperly invade[d] plaintiff’s privacy.”147  Fur-
thermore, it was argued that the defense was merely conducting a 
“fishing expedition.”148 
The district court agreed with the plaintiff.149  The court found 
that “even if the Myspace e-mail accounts did contain e-mails related 
to the plaintiff’s sexual promiscuity, the relevance of such infor-
mation was tenuous” at best, since the Myspace profiles were created 
after the harassment was alleged to have occurred.150  In effect, the 
court held that a defendant could not simply seek discovery of a 
plaintiff’s Social Media content simply based on the existence of a 
profile. 
The Sixth Circuit, in Guest v. Leis,151 found that Social Media 
 
140 No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007). 
141 Id. at *1. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. (Ultimately, the plaintiff’s husband was fired.  The plaintiff complained to the hu-
man resources department but nothing was done with regard to her complaint; in fact, she 
was warned not to bring it up again.  Finally, the plaintiff attempted to commit suicide at her 
office.  Plaintiff was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, major depres-
sive disorder, and panic disorder stemming from her interactions with co-workers and super-
visors at Fidelity Title). 




149 Id. (noting that the defendant “has nothing more than suspicion or speculation as to 
what information might be contained in the private messages”). 
150 Miller, supra note 75, at 31; see also Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *2. 
151 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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users “logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mate-
rials intended for publication or public posting.”152  In effect, the user 
consents to the sharing of information he or she posts on Social Me-
dia sites at the moment the account is created.153  The court in Roma-
no indicated that the entire reason for the existence of Social Media 
sites is to share information with others.154  Also, the court held that 
by joining a Social Media site, like Facebook, a user consents to shar-
ing her information, thus waiving privacy rights to the information 
she posts.155  The court recognized that “[i]n this [Social Media] envi-
ronment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, 
but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful think-
ing.”156 
In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.,157 the plaintiff 
filed suit to recover for personal injuries suffered in a rear-end colli-
sion.158  Defense counsel filed a motion to compel discovery of the 
plaintiff’s Social Networking/Media site information on the ground 
that “those areas to which they did not have access could contain fur-
ther evidence pertinent to [plaintiff’s] damages claim.”159  The plain-
tiff argued that “communications shared among one’s private friends 
on social network computer sites” should be considered “confidential 
and thus protected against disclosure.”160 
In response the court noted that notwithstanding the fact that 
messages can be sent privately to other users, “it would be unrealistic 
to expect that such disclosures would be considered confidential.”161  
The court also stated, rather bluntly, that “[w]here there is an indica-
tion that a person’s social network sites contain information relevant 
to the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit . . . access to those sites 
should be freely granted.”162 
 
152 Id. at 333. 
153 Miller, supra note 75, at 30 (citing Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657). 
154 Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. (quoting Dana L. Flemming & Joseph M. Herlihy, What Happens When the Col-
lege Rumor Mill Goes Online? Privacy, Defamation and Online Social Networking Sites, 53 
B.B.J. 16, 16 (2009)). 




161 McMillen, 2010 WL 4403285, at *1. 
162 Id. 
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In Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc.,163 a MySpace user post-
ed, on her own page, disparaging comments about her hometown.164  
The user’s comments were posted as an op-ed piece in the local pa-
per, naming the user and using quotes from her MySpace page.165  
The response from the community was devastating.166  The user sued 
the paper and the author for invasion of privacy.167  The appellate 
court, in upholding the dismissal of the case, determined that once the 
information was posted on the “hugely popular internet site,” the 
comments were no longer considered private.168 
In Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s School,169 a student 
brought suit against her former private high school alleging, among 
other things, breach of contract, negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.170  The plaintiff, Ta-
tum, was elected head of Student Activities at Miss Porter’s School 
and, as a result, was required “to work with the director of school ac-
tivities to provide and organize all the social activities of the school, 
whether . . . at the school or in cooperation with other schools.”171  
Part of the plaintiff’s responsibilities included organizing the school’s 
annual prom.172  For the 2008-2009 school year, school officials de-
cided to hold a multi-school “consortium prom.”173  At the Porter 
School, opinions among students regarding the consortium prom 
were split.174  Some of the students who opposed the consortium 
prom idea began harassing Tatum.175 
In a request for production, the defendants requested docu-
ments from the plaintiff’s Facebook page that related to the allega-
tions of teasing or taunting.176  The plaintiff argued that “the produc-
tion of information [demanded by defendant was] irrelevant and 
 
163 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 




168 Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862. 
169 738 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D. Conn. 2010). 
170 Id. at 310. 
171 Id. at 313. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (as opposed to a traditional prom). 
174 Bass, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 314. 
175 Id. 
176 Bass, ex rel Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, et al., Civil No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 
WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009). 
19
Koslow: Rape Shield Laws
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
858 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
immaterial . . . .”177  The court determined that “the relevance of the 
content” contained on the user’s Social Media website with regard to 
liability and damages is “more in the eye of the beholder than subject 
to strict legal demarcations . . . .”178  The court noted, “Facebook us-
age depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and state of mind at 
the time of the content’s posting.”179 
It is evident that various courts have recognized the signifi-
cance and public nature of information posted on Social Media sites.  
“[I]f a litigant feels that information was good enough to share with 
his or her Facebook ‘friends’ and later asserts claims to which that in-
formation may be relevant, then the information is good enough to 
produce to the other side in discovery.”180  It is time for Rape Shield 
laws to conform to the recent trend and permit the discoverability and 
admissibility of relevant Social Media evidence into rape trials. 
VI. RAPE SHIELD APPLICATION: A HYPOTHETICAL 
The Rape Shield laws provide that evidence that a victim en-
gaged in other sexual behavior, prior to the alleged rape, is inadmis-
sible on the Federal level in both civil and criminal proceedings,181 
unless the information falls under one of the exceptions in Federal 
Rape Shield Laws.182  Federal Rules of Evidence Rule (F.R.E.) 
412(b) provides the following exceptions: 
(1) Criminal Cases.  The court may admit the follow-
ing evidence in a criminal case: 
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s 
sexual behavior, if offered to prove that some-
one other than the defendant was the source of 
semen, injury or other physical evidence; 
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s 
sexual behavior with respect to the person ac-
cused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by 
the defendant to prove consent or if offered by 
the prosecutor; and 
 
177 Id. at *1. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Browning, supra note 72, at 494. 
181 FED. R. EVID. 412(a). 
182 See id. at 412(b). 
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(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate 
the defendant’s constitutional rights. 
(2) Civil Cases.  In a civil case, the court may admit 
evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior 
or sexual predisposition if its probative value substan-
tially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and 
of unfair prejudice to any party.  The court may admit 
evidence of a victim’s reputation only if the victim has 
placed it in controversy.183 
The rationale for these rules, as stated earlier, is to protect victims 
from being victimized a second time by putting their private lives on 
display during a public trial.184 
The best way to examine the proposed change to the Rape 
Shield rule is to work through a realistic hypothetical.  Assume the 
following: Sara and Bob meet through mutual friends and connect on 
the social networking site Facebook.  Bob is a well-established doc-
tor, well known in the community, and is running for city council.  
Sara is also fairly well known.  She is a yoga instructor at a local stu-
dio and has a tremendous following among students, most of whom 
are her friends on Facebook.  Sara and Bob begin talking and accept 
one another as Facebook “friends.”  Sara and Bob have not adjusted 
the privacy settings on their accounts from the default settings; there-
fore, anyone who would like to search for either of them on Facebook 
can gain access to their information, wall, postings, and pictures.185 
Sara and Bob start developing a relationship, or so it seems.  
Bob asks Sara out on a date.  Sara happily agrees.  After dinner with 
Bob that evening, Sara returns to Bob’s house and they proceed to 
consummate their new relationship in Bob’s bedroom.  For all Bob 
knows, Sara was interested and willing to participate in the evening’s 
activities.  Sara never said no, nor did she provide any indication to 
Bob that she wanted to stop what was happening.  In fact, Sara, in-
tending to relieve her sexual drought, initiated the sexual activities. 
The next day, for whatever reason, Sara decides that sleeping 
with Bob was a mistake, a mistake for which she was determined to 
have a remedy.  Sara believes that Bob went too far the night before, 
 
183 Id.  
184 Price, supra note 13, at 564. 
185 Matt McKeon, The Evolution of Privacy on Facebook: Changes in Default Profile Set-
tings Over Time, BUS. INSIDER (May 7, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
evolution-of-privacy-on-facebook-2010-5?op=1. 
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and, in fact, she has convinced herself that she was raped. 
Sara learns from one of her friends about the Rape Shield 
statute in her state and, like many other women, she now feels com-
fortable pressing charges against Bob.186  Sara initiates a criminal 
complaint and civil proceeding against Bob, stating that he engaged 
in sexual misconduct on the night of their first date.  The local news-
papers pick up the story almost immediately.  The story is the top 
headline for two consecutive weeks.  There is not a person in town 
now that does not know about “Dr. Bob, the rapist.”  Dr. Bob’s repu-
tation is ruined.  He is forced to withdraw from the city council elec-
tion and he has lost virtually all of his female patients.  Many of his 
male patients have been contemplating switching doctors as well. 
At trial, Bob’s attorney seeks to introduce evidence indicating 
that Sara and Bob had consensual sex on the night of their first date.  
Bob’s attorney moves to introduce Sara’s Facebook status updates 
from the days preceding the alleged attack.  Since Bob and Sara are 
friends, Bob had seen some of these postings the day before his date 
with Sara.  The updates include comments such as, “oh, it’s been too 
long, I need some loving!” and “I feel like a sex camel, how do they 
go so long without water???” 
Bob’s defense team also seeks to introduce a “private mes-
sage” that Sara sent to her friend on the morning of the alleged attack.  
In the message, Sara simply writes: “I can’t wait to whore it up to-
night, I am definitely going to get me some tonight!”  Sara’s attorney 
argues that the evidence should be inadmissible, relying on the Rape 
Shield law. 
Applying F.R.E. 412, as it currently reads, to this hypothet-
ical, Sara’s status updates would be undiscoverable and inadmissi-
ble.187  Bob could only offer the status updates as evidence of Sara’s 
sexual predisposition, which is prohibited.  Since they are not subject 
to one of the existing exceptions to the Rule,188 a court would be in-
clined to exclude them, under Rape Shield laws.  The rationale of 
 
186 See John Lausch, Stephens v. Miller: The Need to Shield Rape Victims, Defend Ac-
cused Offenders and Define a Workable Constitutional Standard, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 346, 
346 (1995) (where the victim took the stand at her attacker’s trial, but without the protection 
of a Rape Shield statute, she might not have even filed a police report). 
187 FED. R. EVID. 412(a).  Prohibited Uses: The following evidence is not admissible in a 
civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) evidence offered to 
prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a vic-
tim’s sexual predisposition.  Id. 
188 Id. at 412(b)(1). 
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Sara’s attorney is that Sara’s private life should not be “dragged 
through the mud,” especially after having experienced such a trau-
matic ordeal when Bob sexually assaulted her. 
As F.R.E. 412 reads, Bob is defenseless against the forthcom-
ing criminal or civil matters.  For Bob, it is simply his word versus 
Sara’s, the “victim.”  Since Bob admits that he and Sara had consen-
sual sexual relations, Bob would not be offering the statements Sara 
made on Facebook to “prove that someone other than [Bob] was the 
source of the semen, injury, or other physical evidence;”189 therefore, 
Sara’s Facebook status updates would not be admissible under the 
first exception.  Furthermore, since the comments made by Sara on 
Facebook did not directly discuss her intentions with Bob specifical-
ly, Bob would not be permitted to introduce her comments under the 
second exception, which allows evidence of specific instances of a 
victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused.190  Ulti-
mately, since Bob does not have a constitutional right to introduce 
evidence of Sara’s Facebook commentaries,191 Bob would be prohib-
ited from offering any of the Facebook information at his criminal or 
civil trial,192 despite the fact that he has evidence to indicate that Sara 
intended to have sexual relations on the night in question.  Moreover, 
at his impending civil trial, Bob may again be precluded from offer-
ing the Facebook status updates as evidence of Sara’s mental state at 
the time of the incident.  Sara’s attorney will argue that the probative 
value of revealing her “private” Facebook posts does not outweigh 
the danger of the harm she will face by having her “private” life 
dragged through the mud. 
Bob’s seemingly innocuous date with Sara has ruined his life, 
his business, and his political career.  The direct, specific evidence of 
Sara’s plans for the evening is deemed inadmissible and Bob is left 
hopeless. 
 
189 Id. at 412(b)(1)(A). 
190 Id. at 412(b)(1)(B). 
191 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). 
192 See id. at 412(a)(b). 
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VII. PROPOSED CHANGES TO RAPE SHIELD 
A. Social Media Postings Should be an Exception to 
Rape Shield Laws 
As F.R.E. 412 currently reads, Bob’s attorneys have little or 
no viable defenses against Sara’s allegations; it is simply her word 
versus his.  Although Rape Shield laws are important and should re-
main in effect, it is critical to give all parties a fair trial.  Therefore, 
F.R.E. 412 should be changed to allow discoverability of Social Me-
dia updates to level the playing field in a scenario such as this one. 
As discussed earlier, various fields of law are allowing, if not 
welcoming, the discoverability of evidence from Social Media sites.  
Applying this case law to the previous hypothetical would likely 
make Sara’s comments admissible and potentially save an innocent 
man’s reputation and livelihood. 
As the case law indicates, Sara should not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her Facebook postings; Sara’s comments, 
desires, and sexual predisposition in days leading up to, and on the 
night of the date with Bob, were already public.  Furthermore, Sara’s 
“private” note to her friend on Facebook should also be admissible on 
the ground that notes sent on Social Media sites, by definition, are not 
private.  Allowing Bob to introduce them would not result in Sara’s 
victimization for a second time during a trial.  Sara’s postings defeat-
ed the rationale behind Rape Shield laws and have effectively al-
lowed Sara to use the Shield as a sword against Bob. 
The rationale for Rape Shield laws is noble, useful, and effec-
tive.  Protection of victims from being re-victimized in the public fo-
rum of a court and trial is necessary.  Furthermore, Rape Shield laws 
have been found to serve a legitimate governmental interest by “fur-
thering the truth-seeking process,” which increases the likelihood 
rapists will be prosecuted.193  However, at what cost should the vic-
tim’s privacy be protected?  As evidenced in the “Duke Rape” case, 
Rape Shield laws are opening the door to false accusations and 
“rogue” prosecutors who seek to punish accused rapists.  The accus-
ers have little, if any, reason to second-guess an accusation of rape.  
As indicated earlier, some “victims” feel compelled to construct ra-
 
193 Anderson, supra note 22, at 159. 
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ther lavish stories of sexual assault, without a fear of the consequenc-
es of their actions.  Protecting the victim from a public victimization 
is a valid concern; however, with the proliferation of Social Media, 
Rape Shield laws should be amended to allow the admissibility of in-
formation which is distributed on what is already a very public fo-
rum.  When people share their thoughts, feelings, emotions, pictures, 
and videos with hundreds, thousands, or perhaps millions of other us-
ers in cyberspace, should that information still be considered private?  
To protect the falsely accused, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 should 
contain an additional exception which would render admissible in-
formation exchanged publicly, via social networking sites. 
B. Three-Pronged Test for Discoverability of Social 
Media Evidence 
To insure that a victim’s rights are maintained at the highest-
level possible, and in keeping with the concept of justice, courts 
should apply a three-prong test to determine discoverability of evi-
dence on Social Media websites.  This test is derived from a combi-
nation of the holdings in three cases: EEOC v. Simply Storage Man-
agement,194 Romano v. Steelcase Inc.,195 and Mackelprang v. Fidelity 
Nat’l Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.196 
The test should require that the party seeking the discovery 
first establish that the victim’s Social Media content is relevant to an 
issue in the case.197  Second, the defendant should have to produce 
some evidence to show the likelihood of relevant evidence on the vic-
tim’s Social Media site.198  Finally, courts should require that the dis-
covery requests for Social Media information not be overbroad.199  
Therefore, the defense would have to provide a narrowly tailored dis-
covery request for discovery of Social Media information.200 
C. Application of Three-Pronged Test to Hypothetical 
In the earlier hypothetical, Sara’s comments would likely be 
 
194 EEOC, 270 F.R.D. 430. 
195 Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d 650. 
196 Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149. 
197 Miller, supra note 75, at 32. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 33. 
200 Id. 
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deemed inadmissible, even though all of her “friends,” and anyone 
else who might have searched her page, had access to her comments.  
Since her thoughts, feelings and sexual desires were offered to the 
public at large, the court should apply the three-pronged test to de-
termine if her status updates and message to her friend are discovera-
ble. 
Applying the first prong of the three-prong test—relevancy of 
the information to an issue in the case—a court would likely find that 
Sara’s Facebook statuses, with regard to her forthcoming date with 
Bob, contain content that is relevant to a key issue in the case—her 
intentions with Bob.  Sara’s desire for “some loving” and intentions 
to “get some” on the night of her date with Bob would likely be con-
sidered relevant to her plans for the night with Bob.  While the in-
formation is not necessarily probative of her consent, it does provide 
some basis for Bob’s defense. 
Bob would easily satisfy the second prong of the test, the pro-
duction of evidence from the moving party, because of the relevant 
evidence on the victim’s Social Media site.  Since Bob and Sara were 
“friends” on Facebook, Bob would be able to present visual evidence 
of Sara’s statuses pertaining to her plans for the upcoming date, as 
well as her sexual intentions and desires. 
With regard to the third prong of the test, the court must re-
quire that Bob’s request for discoverability of Sara’s statuses not be 
overbroad.  To insure that Bob’s defense team does not use evidence 
of Sara’s sexual desires to embarrass or harass Sara, Bob’s defense 
team would be limited to requesting the court to compel discovery of 
Sara’s Facebook statuses reflecting her sexual intentions and desires 
for her upcoming date with Bob specifically. 
Rape Shield laws should include an exception for Social Me-
dia information which is relevant to the victim’s intentions, desires 
and state of mind relating to the alleged attack, temporally, implicitly 
or specifically, such that a defendant has some ability to present a de-
fense against life-altering, potentially false accusations.  This excep-
tion should not represent prima facie evidence of a victim’s consent.  
On the contrary, this exception will require a victim to provide some 
additional evidence to indicate that she did not in fact consent.  It 
should also be noted that Social Media information here does not 
constitute pictures, provocative poses, or clothing choices of the vic-
tim.  This exception must only relate to communications by the vic-
tim, relevant to the alleged attack, either on her profile, or through a 
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private message. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as state Rape Shield 
laws, must adapt to the ever-changing technologically enhanced envi-
ronment we live in today.  Case law in myriad areas of law has rec-
ognized not only the viability and importance of Social Media infor-
mation, but also that Social Media information is, by definition, not 
private.  Applying the proposed changes to Rape Shield laws will 
protect a victim’s privacy while simultaneously allowing the accused 
to conduct adequate discovery to present a viable defense. 
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